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2Management teams often experience difficulty in sustaining conversations about the future. The
dynamics of changes has thickened the haze of uncertainty and believing in traditional strategic
forecasting tools becomes increasingly hazardous. As a consequence, strategy meetings often center
around short-term issues. The desired output of most strategy processes however is reduced
uncertainty and some kind of agreement of the long-term direction of the company. A shared vision
of the future is nevertheless hard to find in most firms. The communication of a picture of the future
across the hierarchy risks to become an organizational ritual without much value added. In times of
uncertainty and ambiguity where foresight may be reduced to a ”gut feeling”, hard to express in
words, the communication process becomes challenging. Distributing some leaflets with vision
statements, an article in the in-house magazine once in a while, or some number-crunching in strategy
meetings don’t do anymore. Developing a shared vision means to develop redundant information
about the future, or shared meaning that is stored in more than one brain or body. Yet what does it
take to create redundant information of a ”gut feeling”? How can one communicate what is hard to
put in words? How did Shakespear's Romeo declare his deep love to Juliet?
Words may help, but common experiences are the clue for the creation of shared meaning. Meaning
is generated if people look at what they have done and then try to make sense of these events:
”Although people may not share meaning, they do share experience” (Weick, 1995, p. 188). The
more the message is afflicted with uncertainty and ambiguity, the more difficult it is to create similar
interpretations among organizational members. Therefore, what a member of a group has in common
with other members of the same social group is not so much a set of shared beliefs or values as such,
but a set of shared semiotic procedures or ethnomethods (Shotter, 1993, p. 46). Put somewhat
more succinctly, groups may share a way of meaning creation and a certain set of ordered forms of
communication.
The aim of this article is to look at those ordered forms of communication while developing foresight.
The content as well as the processes of communication have changed in the past decade: We move
from strategic planning to strategic thinking; from forecasts to foresight; from extrapolation of past
trends to the development of human intuition and awareness; from written strategic plans developed
by the strategic staff to embodied knowledge about the future developed through multiple
3conversations throughout the organization; from a pure focus on products and markets to
organizational resources as a source of orientation.
1. In Search for Strategy Tools in the Age of Uncertainty
The craving for a glimpse of the future has a long tradition in human history. People are accustomed
to ask their gods, priests, or wise men about the nature of the future. They used chicken-bones,
crystal-balls, palmistry, or stars as a means of divination. Since the beginning of the field of Strategic
Management in the late 1960s and early 1970s, new theories, methods and concepts have been
developed that aim at explaining differences in firm-performance and help managers to think about
the future of their companies.
”Once societies turned to kings, shamans, priests, and oracles for wisdom. People
had a ‘calling’ to be wise. Now each of us is called” (James, 1996,  p. 25).
Yet most strategic tools derive from the age of classical micro-economic theory, a time when the
most important resources within an industry were tangible, tradable, evenly distributed, and stable.
We are currently witnessing tremendous transformations in our society as our economies venture into
the knowledge-era. The characteristics of these economies are different from those depicted in
classical, and even neo-classical economic theory. Unlike traditional resources, knowledge is highly
dynamic, intangible, at times not tradable, and very unevenly distributed. New organizational forms
and entire industries surface for a short period of time and are then partly merged again into a
network of alliances. In these economies, managers seek for orientation; but traditional forecasting
tools such as trend extrapolation, regression analysis, or technology forecasting are mostly insufficient
to guide them into the future, because they have been developed in a different era, under different
assumptions as described by Leonard-Barton:
”Today’s managers are constantly abjured to ‘stretch the envelope’, manage the
‘cutting edge’, or face down ‘unprecedented’ competition. The future for which they
reach is far from clear, however. Crystal balls may be an obsolete forecasting
technology, but our current tools are little better” (Leonard-Barton, 1995, p. 111).
These observations beg a critical question: How can we prevent strategic management from
becoming antiquated in the era of the knowledge economy? Phrased more ambitiously, how do we
increase the relevance of strategic management theory for managers in the knowledge economy?
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changed characteristics of the economy. Strategy is developed ”inside-out”, i.e., based on the
companies’ resources and not mainly on the organizational environment (Mahoney and Pandian,
1992). More emphasis is laid upon intangible resources such as competence, skills, reputation,
patents, or corporate culture as sources of competitive advantage (Hall, 1994). Knowledge
represents an important source of orientation for the future development of the company.
”Competing for knowledge foresight” stands for the firm’s capacity to image what knowledge will
have the potential to provide competitive advantage in the future. However, conceptual tools that
support the creation of knowledge foresight are still rare. After a brief discussion of the importance
of resources for the strategy of a company, and the discussion of the foresight concept, this paper
outlines various processes that may foresight such as ”early recognition”, ”networking”, ”broad
involvement”, ”physical experiences”, ”experimentation”, ”hindsight”, and the ”early relation to future
tasks”. These processes will be illustrated by means of the case of a small touristic village in the
Swiss alps: St. Moritz. This case is purely illustrative and does not represent evidence of an empirical
nature. The example of St. Moritz has been included to further illuminate the applicability of the
theoretical foresight processes. This article concludes with indicating how managerial roles in the
foresight process change with the increasing turbulence of the environment.
2. The Contribution of the Resource-based View of the Firm
So far, most approaches in strategic management have concentrated on placing bets about what will
be an organization’s next primary task, product, customer, or market (Ciborra, 1996, p. 114). But
as in times of ambiguity and uncertainty these future tasks become increasingly obfuscated, it seems
to be more fruitful to derive orientation from knowledge as a competitive layer. Hence, the question
of strategic conversations might change from ”What are we going to do in the future?” to ”What and
how are we going to know in the future?”.
Although there is a current interest in the competitive advantage that knowledge may provide for
organizations, the concept of knowledge is complex, and its relevance to organization theory has
been insufficiently developed (Blackler, 1995, p. 1021). Management theory was long dominated by
a focus on the company’s environment rather than on the company itself, as manifested in the
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competitive advantage should be sought. Yet over the last 15 years some scholars have established a
second opinion of where the true sources of competitive advantages are to be found. Although its
roots can be traced to the 1950s (Selznik, 1957; Penrose, 1959), the ”resource-based view of the
firm” did not really surface in academic discourse until the early 1980s. Its proponents explained
competitive advantage not as deriving from different product-market positions but from differences in
equipment and combinations of critical organizational resources (Wernerfelt, 1984; Dierickx and
Cool, 1989; Amit and Schoemaker, 1993). As opposed to the ”environment-based view” this
perspective allows sustainable differences in the resource endowment, since some resources may not
be easily transferred or imitated.
Barney´s effort (1991) to evaluate resources in respect of their potential benefits for generating
sustainable comparative advantage was a milestone in developing a more practical approach to an
inward-oriented strategic management. He developed four criteria for assessing what kind of
resources would provide sustainable competitive advantages: (1) value creation for the customer,
(2) rarity compared to the competition (3) imitability and (4) substitutability. Of course, the last two
criteria are the decisive factors for the question whether potential competitive advantage can also be
sustainable. Therefore, imitability and transferability of resources have received a great deal of
attention in the management literature. In sum, the contribution of the resource-based view is to
connect the concept of sustainable competitive advantage with imitability and transferability of
resources.
As a consequence, ”invisible” (Itami and Roehl, 1987) and ”intangible” assets (1992; Hall, 1993;
1994) and ”imitation impediments” (Rumelt, 1984; 1987) for example, licenses and patents, data
bases, individual skills, and personal or organizational networks have gained increased attention in
strategic management:
”As the literature makes increasingly clear, a knowledge-based view is the essence of the resource-
based perspective. The central theme emerging in the strategic management resource-based literature
is that privately held knowledge is a basic source of advantage in competition” (Conner and
Prahalad, 1996, p. 477.  If knowledge is considered to be a resource which is potentially value-
creating, rare, and difficult to imitate or substitute, the management of knowledge becomes a central
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management mean? How can managers transform these hidden assets into increased business? How
can knowledge be exploited and new products, services, and processes developed? Coming back
to our initial question: How can a company develop knowledge foresight?
Although the importance of knowledge for strategy is widely accepted, research so far has not
focused on exploring how this might influence strategic processes. The shortage in models that link
knowledge to strategy may exist at either end. One reason for the hesitant interplay between
knowledge and strategy in companies may subsist on a lacking, or a too abstract strategic intent
(Leonard-Barton, 1995, p. 140).  If a company does not know where to go, it is hard to identify
what knowledge will be important, or core, in the future. Technology - perceived as ‘bodies of
knowledge’ (p. xii) -  ”...has no obvious relevance to a core capability, no apparent connection to
competitive advantage” (Leonard-Barton, 1995, p. 140, p. 140, italics added). Knowledge foresight
processes consequently need to do without a clear picture of future markets and products. Instead,
assuming the knowledge is the source of orientation, firms need to think about their future knowledge
first and then discuss in what markets they will be active in the future. But how can a firm develop
knowledge foresight without a clear product/market vision?
3. The Concept of Foresight
The foresight process aims at creating awareness for and the clarification of the dynamics of
emergent situations (Slaughter, 1990, p. 801). A difficult task, in a dynamic world, in which one can
never fully understand what is happening at a given moment, because what is happening is unique to
that time (Weick, 1995, p. 148). Managers are unable to collect 100% of the relevant information
necessary to completely understand an (emergent) situation. If every situation is perceived as
emergent, and if this situation can only be filled with meaning after it has occurred, the importance of
prediction or forecasting is of limited value. Consequently, prediction perceived as a confident
statement about the future, and forecasting defined as extrapolation from the past into the future by
the application of ”if … then” relations may be appropriate for systems that can be fully measured or
understood (Slaughter, 1993, p. 293). Some writers in the field of management therefore argue that
it might be problematical to think about the future before it has occurred and therefore propose
”future perfect thinking” (Weick, 1995),  or thinking in ”future tense” (James, 1996). Similar to
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then connect back to the present state.
Assuming that it is difficult or even impossible to achieve foresight, the desire to reduce uncertainty
and ambiguity is deeply imprinted in the brains of human beings. Uncertainty arises from the
perceived inaccuracy in ”estimates of future consequences conditional on present actions” (March,
1994, p 174). Uncertainty may be reduced by thinking and talking about ”preferred” futures rather
than most likely futures. Foresight is developed to create futures one prefers or even desires, rather
than having to adapt to likely futures created by others. The foresight process emphasizes the
possibility of influencing/creating one’s own system.
The concept of ”foresight” as described by Hamel and Prahalad (1994) is an attempt to boost the
impact and the efficiency of conversations about the future. ”Competing for industry foresight”, in
their view, is essentially competition for ”intellectual leadership” which allows a company to envisage
the future. In this way, a company may gain control over the evolution of its industry which is mainly
characterized by three issues; (1) future types of customer benefits, (2) the competencies needed to
offer those benefits, and (3) the configuration of the customer interface (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994,
p. 73). Foresight is developed through eclecticism, a liberal use of analogy and metaphor, an inherent
contrarianism, the desire to guide the customer, and a genuine empathy with human needs. Foresight
is the product of a childlike innocence about what could be and should be, curiosity, and speculation
(Hamel and Prahalad, 1994,  p. 82/3). In sum, the quest for industry foresight is the quest to develop
a ”gut feeling” for what does not yet exist.
Hamel and Prahalad apply the term ”foresight” slightly differently from the way in which it has been
used in previous articles. In the field of futures studies, foresight is seen as a human capacity and skill
which is deployed in many ways and protects people from making certain mistakes - it is a mental
process (Slaughter, 1993, p. 293). A typical example of foresight is taking out an umbrella before
leaving the house in case it might start raining. Foresight may be distinguished from mere prediction
and forecasting: the former is a confident statement about the future state of affairs, best confined to
systems that can be fully measured or understood. Forecasts are based on the careful analysis of the
past. ”If ... then” relations are constructed and extrapolated into the future. The concept of foresight
is again distinct from forecasts:
8”Foresight involves a conscious effort to expand awareness and to clarify the
dynamics of emerging situations. The foresight principle is called into play by
irreducible uncertainties created by the precariousness of life. Foresight is ‘common
sense’ in that there is obvious merit in seeking to avoid dangers and reduce risks.
However, the principle is easier to implement on the individual level than at the social
level” (Slaughter 1990, p. 801).
Hence, foresight has not always been the means to create the future as Hamel and Prahalad use the
concept. It is more frequently used to express the human ability to foresee the future in order to
protect oneself from harm.
Ralph Stacey (1996) on the other hand flatly rejects the existence of foresight. He argues that it is
impossible to foresee the future of a complex system with free agents. If an organization is looked
upon as a complex adaptive system, a system that produces changeable and diverse order, whose
behavior is not deterministic and hence cannot be predicted, then foresight changes its nature.
Foresight has to be reduced to the mere recognition of patterns in a stream of self-organizing,
spontaneous action with emerging order (Stacey, 1993). In fact, Stacey goes even further when he
states that ”... free systems cannot have much in the way of foresight and hence cannot be ‘in
control’ (p. 189).” Consequently, it might be impossible to develop foresight at all, and instead of
searching for foresight, it might be more meaningful to deal with the problem of how to live without it
(McDermott, 1996, p. 194). Considering that companies somehow have to make decisions - such
as the allocation of resources - which need to be based on assumptions about the future, it might
however be difficult to live without foresight. The next section therefore attempts to explore ways to
create foresight.
4. Developing Foresight Skills
Understanding the future means at first understanding the past. Organizations as well as individuals
tend to search for a sense of the past which illuminates the present and directs attention towards the
possibilities of the future. Firm-specific resources such as organizational knowledge are path
dependent, hence restricted in their evolutionary scope. Past decisions and actions to a large extent
prescribe the future development of the company. It might therefore be difficult for companies to
develop fundamentally new resources in a short period of time. The probability increases that the
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easily altered, and not entirely predictable in advance” (Arthur, 1989, p. 128). A firm which is
excellent in the dominant discipline (e.g., marketing) reinforces the development of this particular
field, but at the same time inhibits the development of other expertise (e.g., technology). This way a
company’s core-competence may turn into a core-rigidity (Leonard-Barton, 1992). A similar
argument is outlined in Cohen and Levinthal’s study on ”absorptive capacity” (1990) in which the
authors show that innovative performance is path-dependent. They argue that an early lack of
investment in an area of expertise may foreclose the future development of a technical capability in
that area (p. 128).
Although the increased path-dependency leads to a narrower set of options, on the other hand it
lends increased importance to strategic management. Because the company is, at least on the
knowledge level, path-dependent, it is more important to blaze a trail in advance. The ability to
recognize early new knowledge pieces, and imagine how they could develop in the future, hence to
create foresight, may therefore be the distinguishing factor in a knowledge-driven economy. The
following sections describe distinct selected approaches how companies may attempt to develop
foresight.
(a) Early recognition
To recognize early upcoming knowledge, managers may develop a knowledge seeking attitude. The
early recognition of knowledge requires the skill to feel to some extent uncomfortable with one’s own
actions and thoughts, to relax and approach daily activities with humor, to maintain a variety of
activities at the same time, and to use multiple sources of information. These ”perspective skills”
(James, 1996, p. 49) help managers to recognize the factors that may be distorting their perceptions,
decrease the negative effects of ”core rigidities” and support thinking outside the ”dominant logic”
(Prahalad and Bettis, 1986) of the firm.
Early recognition capacities may further include the ability to identify emerging patterns by extension,
elaboration (modification, further developing, or perfecting existing product/services), recycling (old
patterns/trends come back), pattern reversals (opposite trends as responses to new trends; e.g.,
steakhouses as an ”answer” to veggie burgers), strange attractions (odd combinations of patterns or
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trends that seem unpredictable), and chaos (expansion of the focus of observed patterns) (James,
1996). Early recognition further requires cultural knowledge as described below:
”The power of myth is such that most people are unable to separate what they
believe into ‘this is a myth’ and ‘this  is real’. Myths get in the way of understanding
what is happening around us. When we try to process new information about our
lives or our work, we naturally filter it through our existing beliefs - including our full
collection of myths. They cloud our perceptions, tap our emotions, and make it
difficult to see reality” (James, 1996, p. 75).
Myths strongly influence how our vision of the world is created. Cultural knowledge may be
developed by studying children’s myths, reading science fiction, surveying arts, watching for new
symbols, surveying advertising, watching diverse information channels, observing situation-comedy
trends, noticing best-sellers (especially children’s books), noticing new magazines, picking up on
anomalies, opposites, and tensions, watching trends in other countries (James, 1996).
(b) Networking
In a recent study, Liebeskind et al. (1996) examined two highly successful new biotechnology firms
regarding their way of acquiring new scientific knowledge. The study reports that the scientists in
these two firms engaged in a large number of collaborative research efforts from various places,
mostly universities, but also with scientists from other companies. The use of boundary-spanning
social networks by the companies analyzed increased their learning capacity and their organizational
flexibility. Network exchanges extend the scope of organizational learning and facilitate the
integration of expert knowledge from outside. One of the more interesting findings for this research is
that hardly any of the individual-level exchanges of knowledge had a market agreement. This could
mean that individual networking with different partners in distinct fields is a good way to get new
knowledge and test it on a ”low scale”, i.e., without high financial commitment.
(c) Broad Involvement in future search conferences
Creating foresight includes the development of a shared vision of a preferred future. Individual views
on the future are respected to attract knowledge employees that attempt to fulfill themselves in an
organization and thereby maintain and further develop their own identities. Yet how can these
preferences be detected, and more importantly, how can they be reduced to a common
denominator? Future search conferences (Weisbord, 1987) attempt to commit the entire
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organization for a vision of the future. Such large scale conferences bring people closer together in
their goals and attitudes. Face-to-face discussions and the focus on preferred rather than most likely
futures are increasingly important. All organizational members who have an active stake in the
sponsoring of the organizations future should ideally be part of the process. However, future search
conferences are not problem-solving events. People involved have to 1. build up a database, 2. look
at it together, 3. interpret what they find, and 4. draw conclusions for action. These four steps are
taken for the past, present, and future on individual, company, and industry level.
(d) Physical experiences
New data, experiences, and observations are constantly entering somehow our minds and bodies
and remain there in some form. The study of Pisano (1994) gives empirical evidence from 23
process development projects in pharmaceutical companies for the proposition that approaches to
experimentation differ according to the nature of the underlying knowledge. ”Learning-by-doing” has
proven to be a more appropriate strategy for acquiring requisite feedback in an environment where
prior knowledge is weak. In contrast, ”learning-before-doing” (e.g., simulation, laboratory
experiments) is more suitable in a knowledge environment where reliable theoretical models and
heuristics exist. These results demonstrate that there is no best approach to knowledge development
(learning-by-doing vs. learning-before-doing), because learning strategies are contingent on the
actual underlying knowledge environment. Developing knowledge foresight calls for more learning-
by-doing approaches. Such experiences may be labeled ”physical experiences” as opposed to pure
cognitive learning experiences, because these approaches strongly involve physical presence and
generate knowledge that is to a large extent tacit in the bodies of the organizational members.
(e) Experimentation
”Learning-by-doing” is more expensive than the learning-before-doing strategy. Therefore
experiences are needed that allow physical involvement as well as a low financial charge.
”The more uncertain the future, the more essential becomes an environment in which
everyone in the company is primed for experimentation and learning and in which
prototyping is not a specialized, technical activity relegated to the engineers but a
way of thinking” (Leonard-Barton, 1995, p. 118).
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Experimentation creates a diverse portfolio of distinct technological options (i.e., requisite variety in
products and processes), and  it sets up a ”virtuous” cycle of innovation (Leonard-Barton, 1995). A
high tolerance for failure is a prerequisite for generating a climate for experimentation, and facilitates
the generation of multiple experience modes.
(f) Hindsight
The ability to reflect upon the physical experiences and the experiments undertaken is essential for
the knowledge-foresight process. Weick (1995, p. 78) notes that:
”The one small flaw is that strategists take credit for their foresight when they are
actually trading on their hindsight. A well-developed capability for hindsight is
neither a dramatic accomplishment, nor especially rare, which is probably why
strategists shun that depiction of their contribution.”
The importance of retrospect in knowledge-foresight processes is grounded in the idea that one can
only know what one did until one sees what one produced (Weick, 1995, p. 30). By making sense
of the experiences a firm makes, it generates new organizational knowledge.
(g) Relation to future tasks
Knowledge foresight might originate from a clear vision of future tasks, products, or services. Even
though this article started from the assumption that in times of increased complexity of markets, it
might be more difficult to clearly foresee what customers want than it is to envision future company
knowledge, it would be incautious to exclude the possibility to develop knowledge based on a clear
future task.
The next section illustrates such foresight processes. It is described how the mountain resort St.
Moritz tries to stay on ”Top of the World” by carefully screening trends, internalized and converted
into competencies and products. Through the constant push for innovative solutions, experimentation,
a high amount of failure acceptability, and a strong cooperative network, St. Moritz manages to stay
on top of their segment.
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5. Creating Foresight in St. Moritz
Hans-Peter Danuser, the Director of the Tourist Board of St. Moritz, describes the mountain resort
as the ”last real Epicurean and hedonistic paradise where beautiful people of a certain standard from
all over the world meet”. They live in a symbiosis of nature and comfort, relishing the ”champagne
climate” of St. Moritz. Some competitors might ask themselves why these cosmopolitan tourists feel
drawn to St. Moritz. What is it that distinguishes St. Moritz from other resorts that did not manage to
achieve similar results over one century? Obviously, it is not only the location, and certainly it is not
only the nice climate that St. Moritz is sharing with other holiday resorts. The secret of success of St.
Moritz is to a large extend based on its ability to sense the future before it arrives, hence to recognize
and gradually convert sustainable trends into new products and services.
St. Moritz - ”Top of the World”
Located 1856 meters above sea level, St. Moritz is altitudinally closer to ”the top” than all its famous
competitors within Switzerland (Arosa 1815; Zermatt 1620; Davos 1560; Gstaad 1050). The village
has about 5,600 residents and 3,000 seasonal staff - in total, about 4,500 employees work in St.
Moritz. They run 45 hotels and guest-houses with a total of 5,775 beds. In addition, 7,500 beds in
holiday apartments are available to visitors coming mostly from foreign countries (65-70%). Nearly
half the hotels belong to the five-, or four-star category, offering over 60% of the available hotel
beds. In comparison to Gstaad with 542 beds in five-star hotels, Arosa with 435, Zermatt with 412,
and Davos with 272, St. Moritz clearly positions itself in the top segment, with 1,214 beds in five-
star hotels. In total, St. Moritz has about 1,3 million overnight stays per year, resulting in a turnover
from tourism of about 1 billion per year. The budget of the community totals 60 million SFr.
(companies included), whereas 6 million fall to the budget of the tourist board.
Besides other performance measurement indicators such as customer satisfaction, market share, or
turnover, Dr. Danuser evaluates the output of St. Moritz by comparing the tax earnings per capita of
the Canton of Graubünden: St. Moritz holds the second place after the small tourist village of Sils
(SFr. 3,884) with SFr. 3,831, followed by Silvaplana (SFr. 3,811), Sammnaun (SFr. 3,421),
Celerina (SFr. 3,010), Arosa (SFr. 2,931), Pontresina (SFr. 2,722), Laax (SFr. 2,656), Flims (SFr.
2,648), Klosters (SFr 2,614), and Davos (SFr. 2,334). St. Moritz, which is to 100% dependent on
tourism, is even ahead of the capital city of the canton - Chur (SFr. 2,285), and the town with the
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most industry - Domat/Ems (SFr. 1,629). The list of innovations in St. Moritz is an impressive one.
Besides the already mentioned innovations, the list below shows some of the events that the small
village has launched:
- 1st Curling Tournament on the Continent (1880)
- 1st European Ice-Skating Competition (1882)
- 1st  Olympic Games in Switzerland (1928 and 1948)
- 1st  Modern Winter Sport: Cresta (Skeleton)-Run (1885)
- 1st  Golf-tournament in the Alps on the Continent (1889)
- 1st  Bob Run (1890)
- 1st  Horse Race on Snow (1906) - on the Frozen Lake (1907)
- 1st  Ski-school in Switzerland (1929)
- 1st Golf-tournament on a Snow-covered Frozen Lake (1979)
- 1st Polo-tournament on a Snow-covered Frozen Lake (1985)
- 1st  Snowboard World-championship on the Continent (1987)
- 1st Cricket-tournament on a Snow-covered Frozen Lake (1989)
- 1st Bob-run Skating Race (1991)
- 1st Windsurfing World Cup for Professionals in the Alps (1994)
- 1st British Classic Car Meeting (1994)
- 1st Polo World Championships in the Alps (1995)
- 1st Inline Skating Marathon (1996)
Physical Experiences and Experimentation with Selected Trends
The ability to recognize trends might to a large extent be related to a ”gut feeling”, but it can be
actively supported. One source of inspiration for new product ideas is the environment. The tourist
board of St. Moritz does not ask the customers themselves what kind of new product they would
appreciate in the future. On the one hand, the customers do not like being interviewed, and on the
other hand, they believe that it is not very likely to get new inspiration from existing customers. Mr.
Danuser therefore travels around the world and gives talks - once a week on average - to different
audiences at universities, conferences, or companies: ”The questions they ask there are challenging,
and I learn how to think differently.” Marketing for the holiday resort by showing competence in the
lecture is combined with new insights about ”the world outside St. Moritz”. In that way, Mr. Danuser
is constantly exposed to different mind-sets across generations. He gets a feeling for the emergent
cultures and subcultures of society. Hence, one way of getting new ideas is partly to cut himself off
his own organization and achieve a certain amount of remoteness from it - far enough to see
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emergent patterns in the stream of actions of St. Moritz critically, but close enough to ensure his
connection to the community in order to be able to retain influence on critical decisions.
In addition, different kinds of media are carefully studied, always bearing in mind the chance to pick
up interesting issues for the tourist resort as early as possible. When everybody could see Migros &
Coop (two wholesalers) with full-page color advertisements in several newspapers, boosting Inline
Skating equipment, the tourist board was assured that they were on the right track betting on Inline
Scating. In fact, they had started two years previously to think about Inline Skating. This process had
been initialized by Dr. Danuser’s children, who came back from a trip to Copenhagen. They realized
that it was easy to explore such a city with ”Rollerblades” - and was great fun, too. The Danuser
family started to talk about this new leisure phenomenon which had the consequence that the
following Christmas the entire family was equipped with Inline Skaters. He bought the first
”Rollerblades” in the US, not knowing that they were actually produced in Italy. At that time he felt
that he had to try out the new sport because he might like to practice Inline Skating himself. This
procedure is typical for the innovation process in St. Moritz - an new trend/idea is not immediately
converted into a tangible outcome. First, more knowledge has to be gained about the nature and the
sustainability of the trend. This process - earlier described as ”physical experiences” and
”experimentation” - is crucial for successful innovation, because it adjusts a trend to the local
circumstances and increases the understanding of the innovation.
The knowledge generated by the Danuser family effected the entire community: the residents saw the
director of the tourist board running around in his fancy skating-dress, and some engaged him in
conversations about the new hobby. Soon, Inline Skating was the talk of the town. The tourist board
nurtured this process by publishing two articles on Inline Skating in the local Press. When H.P.
Danuser felt that the critical level of knowledge about the new trend existed in St. Moritz, he
gathered the key members of the village, from hotel managers to police officers, to further discuss the
potential of Inline Skating as a new product. The early involvement of all parties facilitated the
development of enthusiasm for the new idea, helped to overcome resistance against change, and
created ownership for the new idea. Furthermore, the shared experiences with the new trend as
decisive to find out whether the new phenomenon is only part of a fleeting fashion or of a new
mid/long-term trend. Only if the phenomenon is a sustainable trend is it worth to investing in.
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A community that has been pampered by success over the last few decades constantly builds up
innovation barriers. They limit change and the development of new products. The recipe of St.
Moritz to overcome these obstacles is to develop gradually develop knowledge before introducing
the end-product. The tourist board involves the entire community in this process: Every member of
the Danuser family was equipped with an Inline-Skating outfit. They generated new knowledge about
the sport through their own bodies. The results were amazing: (1) Inline Skating can also fascinate
people over their forties; (2) the movements involved are similar to cross-country skiing and skating -
hence Inline Skating might be a summer alternative to existing sports; (3) those people already
familiar with a related sport find it is easy to use the Inline skaters; (4) Inline Skating does not harm
Nature in any way; (5) traffic might be burdened; (6) the risk of getting injured can be limited with
professional equipment; (7) Inline Skating is a sustainable trend, which means that after one season
the interest in Inline Skating has not slackened.
Articulation of Competencies and Products: Inline Skating Marathon
The formulation of the idea to market Inline Skating in the form of a marathon event was based on a
careful examination of how the key resources of St. Moritz might be used. A new product is
introduced only if it is built upon one or more key resources: that is what distinguishes St. Moritz
from its competitors. Inline Skating, for example, does not harm the natural environment, it fits into
international culture and even benefits from it. Furthermore, Inline Skating - if limited to specific areas
and time schedules - does not affect comfort standards. But it might interfere with the specific
ambiance of St. Moritz. Traffic problems and commotion might be caused. Hence, the tourist board
reflected on how ”Snowboard kids” some years ago changed the touristic ambiance in some other
holiday resorts, and they studied the way in which Inline Skaters are treated in bigger cities. These
observations led to the decision to create infrastructures exclusively for Inline skaters. For that
purpose, the airport (which is closed from 6 p.m.), mountain-railway areas, the artificial ice-rinks of
St. Moritz and Samedan (as long as the ice has not been prepared), and asphalt streets around the
polo meadow (at specified periods of time) will be reserved and specially prepared for Inline
Skating. The airport and other unique resources of the community can thus be used to add value to
the new sport.
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The next point to consider was how Inline Skating might affect the brand name of St. Moritz ”Top of
the World”. An event only with the traditional Inline facilities (e.g., halfpipe) might not suit the
positioning of St. Moritz. Hence, before introducing the event, the trend Inline Skating has been
reinterpreted, with the result that an Inline Skating marathon will be organized to convey the art of
enjoying the harmony of Nature with sport. St. Moritz attempts to disconnect the image of Inline
skaters acting as ”stuntmen” supported by ”jungle techno music”, and create a new form of Inline
Skating that suits better to the spirit and the brand name of the premier holiday resort.
Experimentation with the product idea plays an important role in the foresight process. For that
purpose, four top-ranking Inline skaters were invited to test the marathon route from Maloja via St.
Moritz and Pontresina to S-chanf. Accompanied by two police cars, these Inline skaters covered the
marathon distance. New knowledge about the potential event has been created; the skaters were
driven by tail-wind during most parts of the route, the temporary obstruction of the main street did
not cause traffic chaos, the entire route is passable, and the skaters were very excited about the
surrounding landscape they were able to enjoy in spite of their exertions. This test created new
knowledge about the Inline marathon, and the four skaters were won over as voluntary helpers for
the product launch.
The experience gained from the four Inline Skaters helped to formulate a clear product idea.
Although experiments have already been carried out in prior development phases, the failure rate of
innovations is high. Danuser assesses this rate at more than 50%. Hence, it is important to be able to
accept failure as a natural part of knowledge development. He states that: ”About 70-80% of our
decisions turn out to be wrong, but we have to make decisions, because we do not like unclear
situations that hamper progress.”
Event marketing has turned out to be an excellent tool to help the customers to develop knowledge
about the new product and to articulate their particular needs. A variety of events is organized with
the support of the tourist board (about 150 in winter and 100 in summer). Inline Skating is a typical
product to be situated in the upper-right quadrant. The new product contains a high potential to
attract new customers (e.g., cross-country skiers; entire families, i.e., including children; active
holiday-guests; an existing Inline Skating community). Inline Skating might even be able to bridge the
gap between the summer- and winter-holidays offered by St. Moritz, because it addresses the
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customer needs of typical winter guests. On the other hand, Inline Skating is quite difficult to
introduce, because potential customers know very little about this trend sport. Customers need help
in articulating their needs. Event marketing provides the opportunity to make experiences together
with the customers and to talk about them. That way entrance barriers may be reduced and the
product may be adapted according to the customers’ expectations.
Events such as the ”Engadin Inline Marathon” convey the message of the new product in an
attractive way. Potential customers get to know more about equipment, different possibilities and
techniques of Inline Skating, the risk of injuries, health benefits, or one’s potential fellow-sportsman.
It is also possible to rent Inline skate equipment at a special rate and to try it out personally. But not
only the customer learns - events represent a good opportunity for the tourist board to get to know
their customers’ needs more accurately and to adapt to them.
 Potential for acquisition
of new customers
low high
Potential for articulation
of customer needs
high
low
• Bob-Run-Skating
• Bob-Run-Biking
• Ability-Competition
   with Dogs
• Gourmet-Festival
• British Classic Car Meeting
• Wintergolf
• Designer Week
• Polo in Winter
 Cricket in Snow•
• Bob-Racing
• Curling
• Ice-Skating
• Biking
• Tennis
• Skiing
• Snowboard
• Cresta-Run
• Polo in Summer
• Greyhound Racing
• Horse-Racing on Snow
• Horse-Jumping on Snow
• Glacier-, Bernina-,
   Palm-Express
• Surf-/Ski Marathon
Figure 1: Innovation Portfolio in St. Moritz
The innovation process described above resulted in more than 300 different events each year,
organized by the residents of St. Moritz. These events then turn into actual products in a self-
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organized manner when members of the community decide to pick up on a successful event. This
way one of the first Swiss schools for Inline Skating was founded in St. Moritz.
The case illustration of St. Moritz described how a mountain resort tries to stay on ”Top of the
World” - how trends are recognized, internalized and converted into competencies and products.
The tourist board knows that due to the fact that the world is constantly changing, the ”Top” is
changing as well. Through the constant push for innovative solutions, experimentation, a high amount
of failure acceptability, and a strong cooperative network, new peaks can be identified or even
created and then climbed up.
6. The Magic of Foresight: Creating and Reflecting upon Strategic
Experiences
This article set out to identify alternative ways to developing foresight in times of uncertainty and
ambiguity. For the ancients in the Roman Empire or Greece, the foresight process was a mystic
experience. Only a few institutions had the power to interpret the signs given by their goods that
would indicate how the future would look like. Similar to those ancient times, few people in most
companies have the power to foresee the future. The basis for such power however changed during
times. Nowadays, most foresight processes consist of collecting as much information as possible,
structuring them, analyzing possible trends or patterns, and developing future scenarios or even
predicting distinct aspects of the future. Power derives from information. Power is concentrated on
the top of the organizational pyramid.
The firm processes information like a mainframe computer. Information is accumulated on the top of
the organizational hierarchy, and top-managers have more information and consequently also more
power to develop foresight. The ”truth” about the future therefore comes directly from the chief
executive officer and is then distributed across hierarchical levels by means of high polish brochures.
Once these brochures arrive at lower management level, they very often become meaningless, even
counterproductive because they damage the trust they have in the company’s oracle. They may live
in a different reality - outside the  messages of the brochure. The information load the top
management team has to process is simply too high, the information content changes too rapidly.
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A possible way out could be the delegation of the foresight task down the hierarchy. Instead of
referring to one main frame of reference (the CEO), the firm starts to process information like a
client-server computer network. Intelligent managers all over the company start to gather their
environment-specific knowledge and draw their own foresight pictures. Those managers are
”empowered” to take whatever decision would be necessary to be successful in their market
segment. The client-server model however implies that managers have time and skills to embark on
the journey to the future.
To develop those foresight skills, this article described alternative ways of foresight creation, distinct
from the mainframe- or client-server metaphor:
1. The potential of knowledge as a strategic layer may be further explored. In addition to
observing the evolution of customer benefits, competencies, or customer interfaces, future research
needs to explore how the knowledge system influences other strategic layers. What and how will we
know in the future? How is new knowledge converted into customer products and services? Does
knowledge play an explicit role in strategy meetings? Are managers able to measure the impact of
knowledge on the profitability of the company? What organizational knowledge is a firm likely to
develop, given its current long-term objectives on product/market level?
2. Foresight partly resides and grows in the body. Along with the increasing importance of intangible
assets in foresight processes comes the tacit dimension of foresight. New data, experiences, and
observations are constantly entering somehow our minds and bodies and remain there in some form.
When inquiring successful managers are questioned about the way a new business idea developed,
they often answer ”It was a gut feeling”. But how does an idea grow in the gut? More research is
welcomed into ”physical experiences” in addition to pure cognitive learning experiences in strategy
processes.
3. If physical experiences become more important when developing foresight, how do they influence
the formal strategy process?. In most companies, the formal strategic process consists of top-
management meetings that are dominated by quantitative data about the current situation and some
bets on how they could develop in the future. This article attempted to show that the foresight
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process may need ”richer” experiences as illustrated with the St. Moritz example. Some approaches
have been outlined to help managers to put themselves into a position to ”act” in a possible future:
early recognition, networking, broad involvement, physical experiences, experimentation, hindsight,
and the early relation to future tasks. These and other approaches need to be tested regarding their
applicability to the exploration of the future knowledge system and the development of foresight
”from within”.
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